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Empirical investigation of the external ¯nance premium has been conducted on the margin be-
tween internal ¯nance and bank borrowing or equities but little attention has been given to
corporate bonds especially for the emerging Asian market. In this paper we hypothesize that
balance sheet indicators of creditworthiness could a®ect the external ¯nance premium for bonds
as they do for premia in other markets. Using bond-speci¯c and ¯rm-speci¯c data for the United
States, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand during 1995-
2005 we ¯nd that ¯rms with better ¯nancial health face lower external ¯nance premia in all
countries. When we introduce ¯rm-level heterogeneity we show that ¯nancial variables appear
to be both statistically and quantitatively more important in the Asian market than in the US.
Finally, the premium is more sensitive to ¯rm-level variables during credit crunches, recessions
and sudden stops than other periods, with stronger e®ects for the Asian bond market.
JEL classi¯cation: F34, G32
Key words: Financing Constraints, External Finance Premium, Asian Bond Markets
11 Introduction
At the end of 2005, the seven Asian economies included in this study-China, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand- had foreign currency bonds outstanding of almost $195
billion. The above ¯gure stands in sharp contrast with $63 billion outstanding in 1995. This represents
more than a threefold increase in foreign ¯nancing through bond markets following the Asian crisis,
suggesting that with improving economic conditions and greater globalization of ¯nance, the Asian
corporate bond market is better able to provide external ¯nance to ¯rms than a decade earlier. Asian
countries have sought to increase ¯nancial market development to avoid dependence on foreign capital
as was the case in the 1990s around the time of the 1997-8 Asian crisis.
For this reason e®orts have been made by the Asian Development Bank to encourage deeper, more
integrated sovereign and corporate bond markets (see Ma and Remolona (2005)) through initiatives
such as the Pan Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF), the Fund of Bond Funds (FoBF) and the Asian
Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) proposal brought by the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers. Gyntelberg
et al. (2005) discuss the limitations that a small domestic bond market imposes on the East Asian
economies, and evaluate the prospects for future development. They are optimistic that larger bond
markets will emerge as ¯rms became larger and seek unsecured, longer-dated ¯nancial arrangements
that improve corporate credit structure, competition and growth.
Some research has been undertaken to evaluate the state of bond market development in Asian
markets by Eichengreen et al. (2006) and Borensztein et al. (2008). They show, using data on individual
corporate bonds issued on both domestic and foreign markets in Asia and Latin America, that while
Asian bond markets are larger and better capitalized, and the maturity of Asian bonds is longer
than Latin American markets, Latin American bond markets are more liquid by most measures, and
they have had more success in attracting foreign investor participation. Although the comparison
is primarily between Asian and Latin American experiences, they also consider the extent of bond
market development and foreign investor participation compared to developed bond markets such as
the United States.
Our aim in this paper is to make a more direct comparison with the United States by asking three
new questions. Do Asian ¯rms have to o®er a higher rate of return compared to ¯rms in the United
States to obtain external ¯nance from the bond markets? Are ¯rms expected to o®er a higher rate of
return for essentially similar ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics such as debt to assets, pro¯tability and risk?
Do they need to pay higher rates when ¯nancially constrained or during credit crunches and recessions
compared to US ¯rms in similar circumstances?
There are several di±culties in attempting to answer these questions. First, it is di±cult to establish
what is a risk free rate for bond issuers to benchmark against in Asia, since local sovereign bonds for
Asia ex-Japan include default risk. The de¯nition of emerging markets employed by Standard & Poor's
1is that the sovereign bond rating is less than BBB+ to qualify for the S&P EMBI+ bond index, and
therefore the sovereign bond benchmark is not a risk free rate. If we were to attempt to assess the
spread of local currency corporate bonds over these local sovereign bonds we would include \transfer
risk" documented by Durbin and Ng (2005), which is the risk that governments would transfer its own
repayment problems to ¯rms in the form of additional taxes, currency controls, or seizure of assets.
While many countries in Asia ex-Japan have consistency had better ratings than BBB+, such as Hong
Kong, Singapore and Korea, we could only assess the corporate bond issues in these countries.
Second, there is considerably greater information asymmetry in Asian countries due to the absence
of internationally comparable ratings, lower reporting requirements, etc (c.f. Eichengreen et al. (2006)).
Financial models of credit spreads in corporate bond markets using structural models of Black and
Scholes (1973) or Merton (1974) and reduced form models of Du±e and Singleton (1997) documented
in Tsuji (2005), rely on assessments of default using market information that is often more di±cult
to obtain in Asia. We follow Tsuji (2005) in assessing the spreads using an economic approach, but
for data from Asia ex-Japan, and the economic model we use fully re°ects the impact of information
asymmetry between the borrower and the external ¯nancier. Models by Ja®ee and Russell (1976)
and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on asymmetric information, which were extended by Bernanke et al.
(1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), provide an agency cost model of external borrowing from
¯nancial markets. Firms will face higher agency costs of borrowing - a higher \external premium" - for
raising capital from ¯nancial markets compared with the cost of internal ¯nance funded from retained
earnings due to information asymmetry and this external ¯nance premium is inversely related to the
¯rms' balance sheet i.e. net worth.
Third, it is also likely that the external premium varies with ¯nancial constraints and with macroe-
conomic conditions that bring about sharp reductions in lending during credit crunches or recessions.1
The experience of the US corporate bond market after the credit meltdown and recession in 2001 and
2002 is an example of this response. Kwan (2002) documents that commercial paper and bank loans
declined considerably in relation to previous years in the US, and the recession that followed in 2001
also appears to have had a noticeable e®ect on access to credit for US ¯rms.2 In emerging economies
1Evidence for the euro area bond market in de Bondt (2004) examines the impact of macroeconomic and ¯nancial
health indicators on the corporate bond spread ¯nding evidence of a balance sheet channel that in°uences bond spreads.
Campello and Chen (2005) report that bonds of ¯nancially constrained US ¯rms in the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income
Database command higher ex ante excess risk premia and these premia move countercyclically with economic and
¯nancial conditions. This result is also supported by Mody and Taylor (2004) who consider the movement of high yield
bonds over government debt, i.e the external ¯nance premium, as a predictor for real economic activity. Levin et al.
(2004) measures expected default risk and credit spreads on publicly-traded debt for US non-¯nancial ¯rms, ¯nding that
¯nancial market frictions exhibit strong cyclical patterns.
2 There is evidence that real variables such as investment and inventory activity responded to the availability of cash
°ow during this period, since the literature shows signi¯cantly di®erent coe±cient values for low growth and high growth
(Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)), and for credit crunch and non-credit crunch years (Kashyap et al. (1993)). As Vermeulen
(2002) notes, the e®ects of ¯nancial constraints and downturns are more likely to a®ect small ¯rms than large ¯rms and
indeed ¯rms that are weaker on other criteria c.f Bougheas et al. (2006).
2Eichengreen et al. (2001) shows this resulted in a sustained rise in bond spreads after the ¯rst half
of 1997, and a persistent drop in volumes. The di±culty is in assessing the extent to which credit
crunches and recessions in di®erent regions are comparable, but our work illustrates the extent of any
e®ect from these events on the external premium.
In this paper we ask whether international currency denominated bonds in Asian markets di®er
from the much larger and more developed US market, particularly in the relationship between the
spread of corporate and government bond yields and ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics. This is therefore a
¯rm-level study of the response of premia in emerging and developed bond markets that takes full
account of the heterogeneity of East Asian ¯rms operating in China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand which are smaller, predominantly bank ¯nanced and have lower
coverage ratios which may mean a higher proportion are likely to be ¯nancially constrained in some
¯nancial markets, see Harrison et al. (2004). Previous empirical investigations of the external ¯nance
premium have been conducted on the margin between internal ¯nance and bank borrowing or on the
margin for raising external ¯nance through equity markets, but we consider the premium in the bond
market.3 The majority of papers that consider the bond market in comparison with the equity market
focus on developed countries and relatively little attention has been devoted to the external ¯nance
premium on securities-based external ¯nance in emerging markets, which is somewhat surprising given
that the value of bonds issued by emerging economies has increased rapidly during the last two decades
(see Genberg and Sulstarova (2008)). We add to the literature by comparing how the external premium
responds to ¯rm-level balance sheet information using an asymmetric information framework to explore
the e®ect of ¯rm-level heterogeneity, credit constraints and recession/credit crunch episodes on the
premium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two o®ers a brief summary of the theoretical
basis for our analysis of the external ¯nance premium, section three discusses the data, the methodology
for determining ¯nancially constrained ¯rms and downturns, and the estimation technology. Sections
four and ¯ve present the empirical evidence and report some robustness checks. Section six concludes.
2 Theoretical background
The in°uential paper by Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG, hereafter) provides the theoretical basis for
our paper. The BGG model incorporates the costly-state veri¯cation (CSV) debt contracting problem
into an otherwise standard dynamic new Keynesian general equilibrium model. In the model there
3The bank borrowing literature includes papers by Kashyap et al. (1993) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995). Equity
premia are investigated by Campello and Chen (2005) and Whited and Wu (2006). This strand of literature is concerned
with questions central to ¯nance such as the nature of equity returns and risk pricing rather than the implications of
the scale of the external ¯nance premium for the ¯nancial accelerator as such. Campello and Chen (2005) address risk
pricing in equity and bond markets, where bond data con¯rm ¯ndings for equity prices.
3are three agents: households, entrepreneurs, and retailers. Entrepreneurs, who are assumed to be
risk-neutral and have ¯nite horizons, acquire physical capital Kt+1 at a price Qt at the end of period
t, for use in production in period t + 1. At the end of period t entrepreneur j has available net worth
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t+1 is the aggregate gross rate of return on capital investment. The realized
revenue in the next period is given by !jRk
t+1QtK
j
t+1, where !j is a productivity disturbance which is
i.i.d. across ¯rms and time.
Adopting the CSV approach, an agency problem arises because ¯nanciers cannot observe !j and
need to pay an auditing cost if they wish to observe the outcome. The ¯nancial contract is a standard
debt contract including the following bankruptcy clause:
If !j ¸ ¹ !j the entrepreneur pays o® the debt in full from revenues and keeps the residual. The









t+1 is the non-default rate on debt.
If !j < ¹ !j the ¯rm defaults on its loan. The lender pays an auditing cost ¹ and receives what is
found, namely (1 ¡ ¹)¹ !jRk
t+1QtK
j
t+1. A defaulting entrepreneur receives nothing.
It is reasonable to assume that the ¯nancier will accept debt only if the expected gross return to the
entrepreneur equals the ¯nancier's opportunity cost. Because the debt risk is perfectly diversi¯able,
the relevant opportunity cost to the ¯nancier is the riskleless rate Rt+1. Consequently, the ¯nancier's
expected return is a function of ¹ !j, the default trigger. Higher levels of ¹ !j raise the non-default pay
o® to the ¯nancier, but also raise the probability of default (F(¹ !)) .
The BGG model is concerned with the entrepreneur's problem of demand for capital. In this model
the cost of ¯nance depends on the ¯nancial health of ¯rms and is negatively associated with the level of










The above equation shows how the ¯rm's return on capital depends inversely on the share of the
¯rm's capital investment ¯nanced by its own net worth. If the ¯rm can self ¯nance its investment
projects, there is no need for external ¯nancing and the equilibrium return to capital is equal to the
risk-free rate. In this case the external ¯nance premium is zero. Similarly, if the ¯rm needs to borrow,
the required return on capital will be higher re°ecting expected agency costs faced by the ¯nancier,
and the premium will re°ect this. Thus, the initial ¯nancial position of the entrepreneur becomes a
key determinant of the cost of external ¯nance.
4 As BGG suggest, the ratio of the cost of ¯nance to the risk-free rate may be equally well interpreted as the external
¯nance premium.
4The role of the ¯nancial accelerator mechanism in the model can be seen from the de¯nition
of aggregate entrepreneurial net worth: Nt+1 = °Vt+1 + W e
t+1. BGG assume that entrepreneurs
supplement their income by working in the general labor market. Thus, the aggregate net worth is the
sum of the entrepreneurial equity (Vt+1) and the entrepreneurial wage W e
t+1. Entrepreneurial equity
equals earnings from capital employed from t to t + 1 minus the debt repayment.
Vt+1 = Rk










where EFPt is the ratio of default costs to the amount borrowed and re°ects the premium for
external ¯nance.
Equation (2.2) shows that net worth would be a®ected by unexpected changes in the return on
capital, changes in the price of capital, in leverage and in default costs. These changes in net worth
will in turn a®ect the spread between the contractual rate on debt or bond and the risk-free rate. For
a highly leveraged ¯rm, a shock to project returns will have a higher impact on internal funds (and
¯nance premia) compared to a ¯rm that has low leverage. To the extent that a borrower's net worth
is procyclical, the external ¯nance premium will be countercyclical enhancing swings in borrowing
and °uctuations of macroeconomic variables will be magni¯ed and propagated through the economy.
The model therefore provides theoretical grounding for the intuition that ¯rms with worse balance
sheets tend to face higher external ¯nance premia and tend to be more vulnerable to adverse economic
shocks.
3 Data, classi¯cation methodologies, and estimation method
3.1 Data
The data for this paper are drawn from Dealogic Bondware, Bloomberg, Datastream and Thomson
Financial Primark.
We use Bondware to identify all corporate bonds issued in international markets. This database
contains information about the issue dates, denomination, currency and the maturity in the bonds
measured. We are also able to identify the type of the coupon (i.e zero coupon, ¯xed and °oating).
All bonds issued in hard currency in China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and
5Thailand were included in the sample.5 The selection of the above countries takes into account the
fact that there is a wide degree of development in the Asian markets.
We use Bloomberg to match all bonds issued internationally with the corresponding bond yields
for the period 1995 to 2005. Bloomberg also contains data on the duration of each bond issue and
its market value. The matching of the bonds with the corporate yield was made feasible using bond
tickers. To address a potential concern regarding illiquidity noise in our Asian sample, we take two
steps. First, in the absence of bid-ask spread data, we focus on bonds with maturity greater than one
year, since bonds that are near the end of their life tend to trade less frequently. Second, we cross
check the names of the sampled ¯rms with those in the i-Traxx Asia ex-Japan index. This index is
made up by the more liquid CDS contracts, which can thus be traded as portfolios (see Remolona and
Shim (2008)). The use of such instruments has contributed to liquid, °exible and diverse corporate
bond markets. We are able to identify more than 25 percent of our sample in the i-Traxx index and
these ¯rms will be the most liquid ¯rms. For the US sample we rely on Datastream to record the
annual average of daily observations on bond yields for the period 1995 to 2005. The analysis includes
the universe of domestic corporate US dollar denominated bonds with Datastream coverage. Our
data contains the benchmark Treasury yields from Datastream for maturities of 3, 5, 7, 10, and 30
years. For each corporate bond that matures at time t, a US Treasury that has the same maturity is
used to provide the risk-free rate referred to in Bernanke et al. (1999), and in those cases where there
is no corresponding government bond, the equivalent government bond is constructed and its yield
estimated using a simple linear interpolation method. For the Asian data, following Durbin and Ng
(2005) and Peter and Grandes (2005) we make reference to international placements in US dollars,
which necessarily excludes placements in local currency. This will help us to avoid any currency or
transfer risk which is associated with sovereign bonds and will make our results comparable with the
US sample.6
Balance sheet data for ¯rms in China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand were taken from the Thomson Financial Primark database. For the US we have linked
market prices of their outstanding securities to Datastream's balance sheet statements. Following
normal selection criteria used in the literature, we excluded companies that did not have complete
records on our explanatory variables and ¯rm-years with negative sales. To control for the potential
in°uence of outliers, we excluded observations in the 0.5 percent from upper and lower tails of the
distribution of the regression variables.
5 Due to data limitations we were unable to retrieve any data on foreign currency corporate bond yields for Malaysian
¯rms.
6A potential downside of considering only international placements is that we do not capture the full picture on Asian
emerging markets since fewer corporates can issue bonds denominated in hard currency, but we believe it is essential to
avoid the distortion that currency risks introduce if we are to make a fair comparison with US bond issues, see Domowitz
et al. (1998).
6Our combined sample contains data for 2729 bonds issued by 652 US ¯rms and 258 bonds issued
by 85 Asian ¯rms that traded between 1995 and 2005 in a variety of sectors including manufacturing,
utilities, resources, services and ¯nancials.7 The panel has an unbalanced structure with the number
of observations on each ¯rm varying between three and eleven.
Our dependent variable measures the external ¯nance premium on corporate bonds using the
spread between corporate bond yields and Treasury bond yields8. To calculate an overall ¯rm-speci¯c
corporate bond yield, we averaged the yields on the ¯rm's outstanding bonds, using the product of
market values of bonds and their e®ective durations as weights.9 Thus, Y TMcorp =
PN
i=1 yiPiDi PN
i=1 PiDi , where
yi is the yield to maturity on the ith bond, Pi and Di are the market value and the duration of the
ith bond respectively. The credit spread is the di®erence between yield to maturity for corporate
and government bonds: SPREAD = Y TM
corp
t;T ¡ Y TM
gov
t;T , where Y TM
corp
t;T represents the yield to
maturity at time t of a corporate bond that matures at time T and Y TM
gov
t;T the yield to maturity of
a government bond with the same maturity. The plots of the average spread and the percentiles of
the distribution are provided in Figures 1 and 2.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Figure 1 shows the average credit spread between corporate and government bonds of the same
maturity issued by US and Asian ¯rms in their respective bond markets. The most notable feature of
the ¯gures, one for the US and the other for emerging Asia, is the sharp response to adverse economic
events. Thus the increase in the spread at the onset of the US recession/credit crunch and the 1997-98
Asian crisis can be easily observed. During this period the average credit spread widened for both
countries, but substantially more so for Asian ¯rms since the spread was up to 10 times higher than
the corresponding US bond spread. While the average spread increased during the crisis it is also
clear that in the ¯nancial turbulence that followed during the Brazilian crisis in 1998 and the Russian
default in 1999, it remained at elevated levels before returning to pre-crisis values until 2004. Likewise,
although much smaller in scale, the US spread increased in the period 1999 until 2000 in the aftermath
of the Russian default and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in year 1998. The spread
remained persistently above the pre-crunch/recession level until 2004 and there is a notable spike in
2002-2003, marking the burst of the dotcom bubble.
7 Our sample includes both non-¯nancial and ¯nancial ¯rms. However, non-¯nancial ¯rms dominate in our dataset;
for example, only 23% of the observations in the US sample correspond to ¯nancials, insurance, investment and real
estate ¯rms.
8We make comparison with the US because it has a deep, liquid bond market in a highly market-oriented ¯nancial
system - therefore it is a benchmark in the sense that it has a well functioning bond market with (presumably) fair-priced
premia for ¯rms with given characteristics issuing corporate bonds.
9 See Choi and Park (2002) for details on the approximation of a bond portfolio yield.
7Figure 2 illustrates the variation in corporate spreads over time across ¯rms in our sample, broken
down by percentiles. The variation in the spreads in the US was similar irrespective of whether the
¯rm was in the 70th, 50th or 30th percentile of the distribution with respect to the spreads. For
Asian ¯rms, the deviation was substantial, and ¯rms in the 70th percentile of the distribution faced
much higher spreads than those in the 50th or 30th percentiles. For the ¯rms with median and lower
tail there was little variation over time in the spreads, but for ¯rms in the 70th percentile, spreads
increased by up to 900 basis points during the crisis. This serves to illustrate the heterogeneity in the
spreads.
The indicators of ¯rms' balance sheets are a central issue in this study and therefore we consider
a set of ¯nancial variables previously employed in empirical studies (see Tsuji (2005) and Cavallo
and Valenzuela (2007)). We introduce leverage (LEV) de¯ned as total debt over total assets, as a
measure of ¯rms' indebtness, since Vermeulen (2002) and Bougheas et al. (2006) argue that higher
leverage implies a weaker the balance sheet. We also include a pro¯tability ratio ( PROF), de¯ned
as earnings before interest and taxes relative to total assets, to measure a ¯rm's ability to generate
revenue. More pro¯table ¯rms have a greater cushion for servicing debt and should pay lower spreads
on their loans. Therefore we expect a negative relationship between this ratio and the external ¯nance
premium. Finally, in our study we seek to control for idiosyncratic probability of bankruptcy by
including Z-scores. The Z-score (ZSCORE) measures the number of standard deviations below the
mean by which pro¯ts would have to fall in order to eliminate the ¯rm's equity. Hence it is an












Aj+Aj¡1], where A is the ¯rm's assets, E is its equity, ~ ¼ is its pro¯ts
and Sr is the estimated standard deviation of r, the ¯rms' return on assets.10 The higher the Z-score
the lower the ¯rm's risk, so we expect this variable to have a negative e®ect on the bond spread. In
addition to balance sheet indicators, we control for the maturity of the bonds, and following Tsuji
(2005) we construct a dummy which takes the value one if the maturity of the bond is over 6 years,
and equal to zero otherwise. We expect a positive coe±cient since yield spreads generally increase
with maturity for investment grade bonds.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the ¯nancial variables used in our study. As expected, we
observe that US ¯rms are less leveraged, more pro¯table, less risky and have substantially lower credit
spreads compared to Asian ¯rms. These preliminary statistics show that US ¯rms have healthier
balance sheets compared to Asian ¯rms. However, given that our Asian sample is relatively small we
provide further graphical analysis to ensure that it is representative across two dimensions. First, we
10 Like Hale and Santos (2008) we set n=2 and lag the variables one year. The volatility of earnings growth Sr is
computed using data for the ¯ve years preceding the sample, scaled by average assets for that period.
8check whether our sample is an accurate re°ection of the universe of companies in Asia as recorded in
the Thomson Primark database. Second, we ensure that our sampled ¯rms are representative of the
¯rms that issue bonds in Asia as shown in Bondware and Bloomberg.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Figure 3 contains three panels which correspond to our ¯nancial variables included in our regres-
sions. We compare the average leverage, pro¯tability and Z-score between our dataset to all listed ¯rms
as recorded in the Thomson Primark database, and all Asian ¯rms with bond issues (both local and
foreign currency). The three series in each panel are highly correlated and exhibit virtually identical
business cycle dynamics. Clearly evident is a steep increase in leverage until 1997 and a corresponding
drop in pro¯ts. The Z-score drops at the time of the crisis and trends upwards for all bond issuers
thereafter. All in all, we conclude that our measures of ¯nancial strength and probability of default
are representative of the the corresponding variables of the universe of listed companies in Asia as well
as of the Asian bond issuers. We now turn to the question of how to classify ¯nancially constrained
versus unconstrained ¯rms and recessions/credit crunches.
3.2 Classi¯cation Schemes
A large literature has considered the impact of ¯nancial constraints on investment in ¯xed capital,
inventory investment, employment and R&D activities (see Bond and Reenen (2006)). However, the
nature of the results is somewhat dependent on the categorization process determining whether ¯rms
are ¯nancially \constrained" or \unconstrained" (see, e.g, Fazzari et al. (1988); Kaplan and Zin-
gales (1997)). The scholarly literature has not settled on a particular strategy to identify ¯nancially
\constrained" and \unconstrained" ¯rms empirically, but the classi¯cation scheme can be critically
important for the conclusions of these studies. Therefore, in this paper we use three di®erent mea-
sures of ¯nancial constraints to ensure the robustness of our results, these are size, indebtness and
creditworthiness.
Size was employed as a criterion by Bougheas et al. (2006) and is the key proxy for capital market
access by manufacturing ¯rms in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) because small ¯rms are more vulnerable
to capital market imperfections and thus more likely to be ¯nancially constrained. Firms that are
more indebted (based on the leverage ratio) are more likely to pay a higher external ¯nance premium
on bonds since they have a greater probability of bankruptcy (Bougheas et al. (2006)), which can
raise the cost of borrowing, and negatively a®ect the availability of credit. Finally, the coverage ratio,
measured as earnings before interest and taxes over total debt, can be used as a ¯nancial sample
separation criterion because it measures project quality. Interest coverage was used by Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) as an indicator of the extent to which ¯nancial constraints drive di®erences in inventory
9investment. We report results using all three classi¯cation schemes. We use a 30 percent cut-o® point
in keeping with the normal practice in the literature.11 We also allow ¯rms to transit between ¯rm
classes.12
3.3 Recession and credit crunch
We specify a time-period dummy variable to indicate that the ¯rms faced recession, credit crunch or
Asian crisis. Focusing on the US, the identi¯cation of downturns and out-of-downturns follows the
Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research which determined
that a trough in business activity occurred in the US economy in November 2001. The trough marked
the end of the recession that began in March 2001 and the beginning of an expansion.13 The credit
crunch, when some ¯rms were excluded from gaining access to credit lasted from 2001- 2002, and was
closely associated with the recession (Kwan (2002)). During the years 2001-2002 bad debts increased
on bank loans, commercial paper issuance fell and default rates in the US bond market associated
with most rating categories were at post-war highs. Similarly, for the Asian economies we specify a
crisis dummy to capture the fact that the second half of 1997 saw the unprecedented collapse of the
stock markets and currencies of ¯ve Asian countries { Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines
and South Korea with secondary e®ects through the rest of Asia. There is evidence that the crisis
adversely in°uenced the ability of ¯rms to access credit on international market.
3.4 Panel estimation technology
We employ panel data methods to test the hypothesis that ¯rms with di®erent characteristics face
di®erent external ¯nance premia in the bond markets. Consider a standard static linear model of the
following form:
yit = Xit¯ + ¸t + ´i + ²it (3.1)
where i = 1,2,..., N refers to a cross section of units (¯rms in this study), t = 1,2,..., T refers
to time period, and denote respectively the dependent variable and the vector of non-stochastic ex-
planatory variables for the ¯rm i and year t. ¸t represents ¯rm-invariant time-speci¯c e®ects, ´i is the
time invariant unobservable ¯rm speci¯c e®ects and ²it are the disturbance terms that vary with time
11Campello and Chen (2005) rank the sampled ¯rms into constrained and unconstrained using 30 percent and 70
percent cut-o® points respectively from the Fama-French portfolios.
12 For this reason, our empirical analysis will focus on ¯rm-years rather than simply ¯rms. See Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) for a similar approach.
13 For more details see the latest report of the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic
Research. July 17, 2003.
10and across ¯rms. To control for cyclical factors originating from the business cycle we include time
dummies in our regressions, we also incorporate industry dummies to control for ¯xed e®ects across
industries. In the model in which we pool seven Asian economies, in addition to time and industry
dummies we also include country dummies to control for any country-based institutional di®erences.
Equation (3.1) confronts us with some econometric issues regarding the most appropriate estimation
method.14 In the presence of the ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects ´i, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation would
produce biased results. If these ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects are uncorrelated with Xit then the random e®ects
estimator is unbiased and e±cient. If on the other hand, the ¯rm-speci¯c e®ects are correlated with Xit
but remain strictly exogenous then the random e®ects estimator will be biased, but the within-groups
estimator will be unbiased. Given that our sample is drawn from a large population it is more likely
that ¯rm-speci¯c terms are distributed randomly across cross-section units, and therefore uncorrelated
with Xit variables, thus we take a random e®ects approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity.15
This choice is formally justi¯ed by using both the Hausman and Breusch Pagan Langrangian Multiplier
tests. We report these tests at the foot of the tables of results. In all cases the Hausmann test does
not reject the null of no correlation between the regressors and the individual e®ects, and the LM test
rejects the null that the individual e®ect is zero16.
4 Results
In this section we report estimates of the random e®ects model using interaction terms for the estima-
tions to identify the asymmetric e®ects of the ¯nancial accelerator.17 Unless otherwise speci¯ed the
columns of each Table indicate the estimation results for di®erent ¯rm-years according to size (SIZE,
column 1), level of indebtness (INDEBT, column 2) and creditworthiness (COV, column 3).
14 We would like to thank Steve Bond for his comments on the econometric modeling strategy adopted in this paper.
15 Note that the above assumption closely relates to our decision on whether the sample can be considered as part of a
larger population since we consider only ¯rms that issue bonds not the universe of US and Asian ¯rms. All estimations
were carried out in STATA 10.
16 While our model is robust to ¯rm-speci¯c heterogeneity since we account for these factors explicitly in our model,
we may still encounter endogenity bias. The usual solution to endogeneity bias would be a a dynamic GMM estimator
with instrumental variables, but we are unable to estimate a dynamic panel GMM-estimator because of two important
considerations. First, the Asian crisis occurs close to the beginning of our sample, and thus the dynamic GMM-
procedure poses a problem for our study since the requirement for instruments and the use of ¯rst di®erences and lags
of dependent variable would lead to a considerable loss of observations, including the recession period. This would
substantially undermine the asymmetric e®ects of the ¯nancial accelerator, which are vitally important for this study.
Second, our sample is relatively short and when applying dynamic panel data estimators to short samples one might
be confronted with severe bias in the estimates. In short samples Mulkay et al. (2000) point out that static estimation
procedure provides more precise estimates. Nevertheless, when we applied a static GMM procedure to the US sample
we found that the results were very similar to the random e®ects estimates (results are available from the authors upon
request). We conclude therefore that the extent of endogeneity is very limited in our US sample.
17 Using interaction terms allows us to avoid problems of endogenous variable selection, to gain degrees of freedom,
and to take into account that ¯rms can transit between groups.
114.1 External ¯nance premium and ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics
An important assumption of the ¯nancial accelerator theory is that borrowers' net worth (¯nancial
health) is inversely related to the external ¯nance premium and that ¯rms with weak balance sheets
are likely to be more vulnerable to real or economic shocks. In this section we test whether an inverse
relationship between balance sheet indicators and external ¯nance premium holds for ¯rms in the US
and Asian bond market. Initially, we estimate the empirical model without distinguishing between
constrained and unconstrained ¯rms.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Table 2 reports the estimated coe±cients on the explanatory variables, LEV, PROF, ZSCORE
and MATDUM in the baseline model for the US and Asia in separate columns. The results show
that ¯rms with higher LEV will face a higher external ¯nance premium compared to those with lower
leverage because the coe±cient on leverage is positive and signi¯cant. PROF has signi¯cant negative
coe±cients showing that the greater the pro¯tability of the ¯rms the lower the external premium. The
Z-score variable also has a signi¯cant negative coe±cient implying that ¯rms with high Z-score and
therefore with lower bankruptcy risk, face a smaller premium. Finally, the coe±cients on the maturity
dummy enter with the expected positive sign but they are insigni¯cant for both countries. Overall, the
results appear similar in terms of sign and statistical signi¯cance for both panels but their magnitudes
reveal considerable di®erences. Taking the results for LEV as a case in point, the estimate for LEV in
the US sample (0.012) indicates that the elasticity of credit spread with respect to leverage, evaluated
at sample means, is 0.306, so that a 10% increase in leverage implies a 3.06% increase in credit spread.
Looking at the coe±cient on LEV for the Asian sample (0.170), this shows that the elasticity of credit
spread with respect to leverage, evaluated at sample means, is 1.057. A 10% increase in leverage leads
therefore to a 10.57% increase in credit spread. In other words, leverage appears to be economically
more signi¯cant in Asia and a similar increase results in ten times increase in the spread. Similar
di®erences in magnitudes are observed between the US and Asian ¯rms for the remaining ¯nancial
variables. We conclude therefore that ¯rms' ¯nancial health is important for the external ¯nance
premium for both countries but with much higher magnitudes for the Asian sample. The estimated
coe±cients on the balance sheet variables measure the average e®ect over all sectors, all size classes
and all years with the correct sign as predicted by the ¯nancial accelerator theory, and suggest that
balance sheet characteristics and the risk of bankruptcy are highly signi¯cant determinants of the
bond market external ¯nance premium. This con¯rms that there is an inverse correlation between
the external ¯nance premium in the bond market and the ¯rm's ¯nancial health as predicted by the
economic model under asymmetric information.
124.2 The ¯nancial accelerator and ¯nancial constraints
We now consider the impact of ¯nancial constraints on the response to balance sheet characteristics in
Table 3. We use three di®erent categorization methods for determining whether a ¯rm is constrained
(Cons) or unconstrained (1-Cons) based on size, degree of indebtness and creditworthiness. Once again,
our results are reported separately for the US and Asian ¯rms in Columns 1-3 and 4-6 respectively.
Our results are remarkably consistent across these categories and document an `excess sensitivity' of
¯nancial variables for constrained Asian ¯rms but not for their US counterparts. We report formal
tests of equality of coe±cients at the foot of the Table. The upshot is that for ¯rms with similar
characteristics the premium is higher in Asia compared to the US.
[Insert Table 3 here]
For the US, in Columns 1-3, we observe that LEV has estimated coe±cients that are positive and
signi¯cant for constrained ¯rms, but the coe±cients are not signi¯cantly di®erent from each other.
We conclude that the external ¯nance premium in the US bond market rises for constrained and
unconstrained ¯rms with higher leverage. However, a completely di®erent picture emerges for the
Asian model. Leverage is highly signi¯cant only for ¯rms which face binding ¯nancing constraints,
while it is insigni¯cant for unconstrained ¯rms. Consider the comparison of Columns 1 and 3: the
point estimates suggest that leverage has a weaker e®ect on US ¯rms' external ¯nance premium since
the elasticity of spread with respect to leverage is 0.09 for US ¯rms, compared to 0.77 for the Asian
sample. This result implies that leverage is more acute for constrained Asian ¯rms lending support
to the ¯nancing constraints story when we use SIZE to determine constraints, but similar elasticities
emerge for using INDEBT and COV as classi¯cation schemes.
Pro¯tability measure, PROF, has a negative coe±cient as predicted by the ¯nancial accelerator
theory for all types of ¯rms in the US and Asia. The coe±cients are not statistically di®erent from
each other when we compare constrained and unconstrained ¯rms in the US. For the Asian sample of
¯rms we ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences between constrained and unconstrained ¯rms because the negative
coe±cients are highly signi¯cant for constrained ¯rms but insigni¯cant for their unconstrained coun-
terparts. Once again, formal tests reveal that the coe±cients are always signi¯cantly di®erent from
each other. Looking at Columns 1 and 3, the elasticities evaluated at sample means suggest that a
10% rise in pro¯t is associated with a 0.58% fall in credit spread for constrained US ¯rm-years, and a
2.40% fall for their Asian counterparts. We interpret this ¯nding as a further support for the excess
sensitivity story.
The risk of default, as measured by the Z-SCORE, is found to be signi¯cant for both types of ¯rms
but is not statistically di®erent between constrained and unconstrained ¯rms in the US. The same
is true for the Asian sample where Z-SCORE is always negative and signi¯cant for both constrained
13and unconstrained ¯rms. The coe±cients indicate that a 10% rise in Z-score leads to a 0.88% fall in
external premium for constrained US ¯rm-years, and to a 5.69% fall for constrained Asian ¯rm-years.
Our results show that it is the constrained ¯rms, by any de¯nition we used, that show greater
sensitivity to ¯rm characteristics when comparing US and Asian ¯rms. Fazzari et al. (1988), Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994), Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Bougheas et al. (2006) found that the external
premium for bank loans moves countercyclically with balance sheet characteristics, and is more sen-
sitive for ¯rms that are ¯nancially constrained. We ¯nd similar results for the external premium on
corporate bonds: the premium is more sensitive to balance sheet characteristics for constrained ¯rms
but this is dependent on the ¯nancial system under scrutiny. This is a new result that complements
the earlier work.
Two main implications can be highlighted from our results. First, balance sheet indicators appear
to be very important in determining the credit spread both in the US and in Asia but they play
a more prominent role in the latter market. Second, the impact of ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics on
the external premium for corporate bonds di®ers for constrained and unconstrained ¯rms when we
consider the Asian sample, but not for the US sample. These results con¯rm that the balance sheet
channel is operative through the bond market, supporting earlier evidence from the US and Europe
in de Bondt (2004), Levin et al. (2004) and Campello and Chen (2005), but there is further evidence
on the implications of the bond market underdevelopment in Asia. For example, Eichengreen and
Luengnaruemitchai (2004), Eichengreen et al. (2006) and Borensztein et al. (2008) suggest that in
East Asia the process of bond market development remains slow despite their attempts to harmonize
the regulations and create an integrated regional bond market.18 In this paper, we document that
capital market imperfections play a more important role in the Asian bond ¯nance, in contrast to
the US bond market, where there is not evidence of a signi¯cantly di®erent response to balance sheet
characteristics for ¯nancially constrained ¯rms. We argue that the greater sensitivity results from
the greater information asymmetries in Asia between ¯rms and the \arms-length" potential buyers of
bonds, and this results to some degree from the smaller and less e±cient operation of the bond market
in the Asian region.19 We suggest therefore that the underdevelopment in the Asian markets magni¯es
the impact of ¯nancial factors.
18It is a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that bond market development even if it is largely con¯ned to the public
sector debt market could be a spur to corporate bond issues. Lejot et al. (2008) make similar arguments.
19 It should be noted that there is a range of ¯nancial development in Asia, and certainly Hong Kong, Korea and
Singapore are well developed compared to the other Asian countries in our paper. Nevertheless, there is some recognition
in the region that the bond market is relatively underdeveloped and that corporate ¯nance is primarily bank based, or
for larger ¯rms, equity based.
144.3 Responses to the recession, credit crunch and Asian crisis
To explore the response to ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics when the ¯rms faced a recession/credit crunch
we interact the explanatory variables with a recession/credit crunch dummy, D. Previous evidence
suggests that there is signi¯cant di®erence in the response of real variables in periods of recession
versus non-recession (c.f. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Vermeulen (2002) and Mody and Taylor (2004)).
There is anecdotal evidence in Kwan (2002) that the credit crunch of 2001-2002 also in°uenced access
to commercial paper and bank ¯nance for US ¯rms. As far as we are aware a comparison of the
recession/credit crunch and the Asian crisis has not been explored for bond ¯nance, and this section
addresses this issue by examining the sensitivity of the external premium to balance sheet variables in
the 2001-02 recession/credit crunch episode versus other times for the US ¯rms, and for the 1997-98
crisis for the Asian ¯rms. Table 4 reports coe±cients on variables interacted with the dummy variable
D (recession/credit crunch) and interacted with 1-D (out of recession/credit crunch) for constrained
and unconstrained ¯rms.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Our results in Table 4 give a clear indication that there is a signi¯cantly di®erent response in
recessions/credit crunches with respect to ¯nancial variables in Asia but not in the US. Taking the US
bond market, when the recession/credit crunch dummy (D) is interacted with constrained (Cons) and
unconstrained (1-Cons) ¯rms we are unable to observe any signi¯cant di®erence between coe±cients
during recessions and out of recessions periods. On the other hand, when we look at the Asian case,
we ¯nd that there is greater sensitivity to LEV, PROF and ZSCORE for constrained ¯rms during
the Asian crisis but insigni¯cant results for other periods (i.e rows where the D*(Cons) interaction is
explored). In addition, our results show that where there is a signi¯cant di®erence in the response for
constrained versus unconstrained ¯rms for Asian ¯rms the external ¯nance premium is more sensitive
to LEV, PROF and ZSCORE for constrained ¯rms in the recession/credit crunch con¯rming earlier
results in Table 3. We conclude that the 1997-98 crisis had a considerable impact through the balance
sheet on external ¯nance premia in the Asian bond market, and could have operated alongside other
channels to in°uence real variables.
5 Robustness
We have subjected our model to some degree of robustness testing already by using three di®erent
measures of ¯nancial constraint, which results in ¯ndings that are very similar for all three measures.
In this section we provide a robustness analysis of our results by considering the potential selection
bias problem.
155.1 Panel Attrition and Selectivity Bias
One feature of our data that could in°uence biases and inconsistencies in the regression estimates
is its unbalanced structure since the number of observations on each ¯rm varies between three and
eleven. In this paper we perform an Added-Variable procedure (or Quasi-Hausman test) as suggested
by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) by constructing an arti¯cial variable that tests for attrition bias. The
results for the balance sheet indicators and credit spread are shown in Table 5.
[Insert Table 5 here]
We re-estimate Table 3 with the random e®ects method including the arti¯cial variable, Attrition,
which takes a value of unity if the ¯rm is observed for the full sample, and zero otherwise.20 Under
the null-hypothesis of non-selective response in our panel structure, the estimated coe±cient for the
Attrition is statistically insigni¯cant and thus the estimated model is appropriate. Under the alterna-
tive hypothesis of sample selectivity, however, the coe±cient is non-zero and static panel data models
yield biased and inconsistent estimation results. The estimated coe±cient of the attrition variable is
negative but statistically insigni¯cant in all the speci¯cations (both the US and Asian) suggesting that
our ¯ndings are not a®ected by biases resulting from endogenous panel data attrition. Additionally,
the coe±cients on the other variables are similar to those obtained in Table 3. We therefore conclude
that this exercise con¯rms that sample selection is unlikely to introduce strong biases in our estimated
coe±cients.
6 Conclusion
Firms in Asian countries have been very reliant on external ¯nance form foreign countries, but following
the Asian crisis in 1997, steps were taken to develop ¯nancial markets in the region. The ABF is one
such initiative that has been taken, although its e®ects as yet are small according to McCauley and
Remolona (2004); Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Eichengreen et al. (2006).
Unlike previous papers we take an economic approach to the bond spread (or external ¯nance
premium) that re°ects information asymmetry problems following Bernanke et al. (1999). The vast
majority of empirical studies on the external ¯nance premium have focused on the margin between in-
ternal ¯nance and bank borrowing or equities and relatively little attention has been given to corporate
bonds. Even fewer papers have considered the di®erences between emerging market and developed
country bond market premia. Our results based on ¯rm-level data for the US and Asian bond markets
20 We de¯ne an indicator variable responseit such as responseit = 1 if (yit;xit) is observed and 0 otherwise. Next,
we construct the attrition variable as attritioni =
PT
t=1 responseit, indicating the total number of periods the ith
individual is observed, and include attritioni as additional regressor in our random e®ects model.
16during the period 1995-2005 suggest that ¯rms with better ¯nancial health, as measured by balance
sheet indicators, face a lower external ¯nance premium. After separating ¯rms into constrained and
unconstrained categories using three di®erent classi¯cation schemes we ¯nd ¯rms that are credit con-
strained have higher premia than unconstrained ¯rms in the Asian market, but similarly de¯ned ¯rms
in the US show no signi¯cant di®erences. This implies that the premium on bond ¯nance is higher in
Asian markets for these types of ¯rms, re°ecting the higher risk characteristics associated with ¯rms
that are ¯nancially constrained and subject to grater information asymmetries. When we compare the
e®ects of the recession/credit crunch episode in 2001-02 for the US ¯rms and the Asian crisis in the
1997-98 for Asian ¯rms, we ¯nd that the sensitivity of the premium is greater for constrained ¯rms
during the Asian crisis compared to other times, but there is no di®erence in the sensitivity of the
premium for US ¯rms in the recession/credit crunch.
These results provide new evidence that ¯rm-level heterogeneity, ¯nancing constraints and capital
shortages raise the external ¯nance premium in the Asian bond markets compared to the US due to
the e®ects of greater information asymmetry in the Asian region.
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19Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean St.Dev. N
US
SPREADit 1.21 1.89 2794
LEVit 28.94 17.38 6693
PROFit 8.46 7.12 6587
ZSCOREit 3.97 2.00 5358
ASIA
SPREADit 4.42 13.58 299
LEVit 32.77 23.79 773
PROFit 5.33 11.03 773
ZSCOREit 1.83 2.09 616
Notes: The subscript i indexes ¯rms, and the subscript t, time, where t = 1995-2005. SPREADit: The di®erence between corporate
bond yields and government bond yields of the same maturity. LEVit: Total debt to total assets. PROFit: Earnings before interest and


















Time Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Country Dummies No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the credit spread, as de¯ned by the di®erence between corporate bond yields and government bond
yields of the same maturity. Robust z-statistics are reported in the round brackets. The standard errors are corrected for clustering.
MATDUM is a dummy which takes the value one if the maturity of the bond is over 6 years, and equal to zero otherwise. The Hausman Test
is distributed as a chi-squared distribution under the null of no correlation between the regressors and the individual e®ects. The Langrangian
Multiplier Test (LM test) is distributed as chi-squared and the null is that the individual e®ect is zero. Numbers of ¯rms and of observations
are 635 and 2657, respectively in the US. Numbers of ¯rms and of observations are 81 and 255, respectively in the Asian sample. Also see





SIZE INDEBT COV SIZE INDEBT COV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LEVit ¤ Cons 0.016*** 0.007** 0.008* 0.370*** 0.191*** 0.500***
(2.77) (2.09) (1.69) (3.65) (2.63) (3.82)
LEVit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) 0.010** 0.007 0.004 0.106 0.006 0.095
(2.41) (0.98) (1.49) (1.50) (0.014) (1.59)
PROFit ¤ Cons -0.036** -0.025*** -0.031** -0.850*** -0.521*** -2.676***
(-2.35) (-3.48) (-2.19) (-3.63) (-3.25) (-4.12)
PROFit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) -0.029*** -0.016 -0.006 -0.108 0.001 0.039
(-4.19) (-1.64) (-0.83) (-0.65) (0.0052) (0.28)
ZSCOREit ¤ Cons -0.119** -0.024 0.007 -4.604*** -3.861*** -3.732**
(-2.24) (-0.77) (0.17) (-3.03) (-3.21) (-2.17)
ZSCOREit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) -0.137*** -0.030 -0.049* -2.407* -2.861 -2.166**
(-3.18) (-0.82) (-1.68) (-1.86) (-1.41) (-1.98)
MATDUM 0.053 0.086 0.074 0.831 0.204 1.481
(0.26) (0.40) (0.34) (0.27) (0.064) (0.59)
Constant 1.523*** 1.066*** 1.021*** 26.144 19.548 0.525
(3.59) (2.97) (2.85) (1.36) (1.15) (0.035)
R2 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.29 0.28 0.28
Hausman 9.74 19.98 9.98 12.12 27.81 14.76
LM 678.66*** 686.23*** 672.94*** 195.14*** 160.26*** 156.02***
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Test of equality (p-value): LEV 0.12 0.98 0.38 0.00 0.65 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): PROF 0.66 0.44 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): ZSCORE 0.67 0.87 0.14 0.16 0.60 0.40
Notes: The dependent variable is the credit spread, as de¯ned by the di®erence between corporate bond yields and government bond
yields of the same maturity. The dummy variable CONS indicates in turn SMALL, HIGHLY INDEBTED, and RISKY ¯rms. Robust
z-statistics are reported in the round brackets. The standard errors are corrected for clustering. The Hausman Test is distributed as a
chi-squared distribution under the null of no correlation between the regressors and the individual e®ects. The Langrangian Multiplier Test
(LM test) is distributed as chi-squared and the null is that the individual e®ect is zero. Numbers of ¯rms and of observations are 635 and
2657, respectively in the US. Numbers of ¯rms and of observations are 81 and 255, respectively in the Asian sample. Also see notes to Table
1. * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
21Table 4
Responses to the Recession/Crunch
and Asian crisis
US ASIA
SIZE INDEBT COV SIZE INDEBT COV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LEVit ¤ Cons ¤ D 0.019** 0.008 0.005 0.574*** 0.243* 0.554*
(2.13) (1.50) (0.76) (3.15) (1.85) (1.88)
LEVit ¤ Cons ¤ (1 ¡ D) 0.015*** 0.008** 0.011* 0.098 0.011 0.350**
(2.63) (2.03) ( 1.80) (0.87) (0.12) (2.42)
LEVit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) ¤ D 0.008* 0.009 0.007 0.137 0.549 0.127
(1.70) (1.07) (1.64) (1.27) (0.47) (1.23)
LEVit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) ¤ (1 ¡ D) 0.011*** 0.005 0.003 0.042 -0.284 0.049
(2.61) (0.62) (0.90) (0.49) (-0.81) (0.66)
PROFit ¤ Cons ¤ D -0.070** -0.030** -0.030 -2.479*** -1.762*** -3.575***
(-2.03) (-2.39) (-1.35) (-4.54) (-4.63) (-3.17)
PROFit ¤ Cons ¤ (1 ¡ D) -0.018* -0.021*** -0.034* -0.044 -0.213 -0.814
(-1.65) (-3.21) (-1.91) (-0.17) (-1.19) (-0.76)
PROFit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) ¤ D -0.028*** -0.017 -0.009 -0.378 1.034 -0.255
(-3.21) (-1.35) (-0.97) (-0.76) (0.20) (-0.50)
PROFit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) ¤ (1 ¡ D) -0.031*** -0.014 -0.003 -0.065 0.023 0.077
(-3.71) (-1.27) (-0.49) (-0.39) (0.10) (0.54)
ZSCOREit ¤ Cons ¤ D -0.046 0.006 0.064 -10.890*** -8.113*** -13.077***
(-0.58) (0.14) (1.12) (-3.18) (-3.72) (-3.47)
ZSCOREit ¤ Cons ¤ (1 ¡ D) -0.159*** -0.043 -0.031 -3.608** -3.921*** -2.205
(-3.09) (-1.50) (-0.63) (-2.40) (-3.23) (-1.17)
ZSCOREit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) ¤ D -0.139*** -0.011 -0.030 -5.446** -14.700 -4.944**
(-2.85) (-0.24) (-0.74) (-2.25) (-0.22) (-2.18)
ZSCOREit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) ¤ (1 ¡ D) -0.136*** -0.040 -0.059** -2.645** -2.802 -2.479**
(-3.17) (-0.93) (-2.00) (-2.09) (-1.55) (-2.19)
MATDUM 0.052 0.084 0.070 2.160 2.052 1.624
(0.25) (0.39) (0.33) (0.72) (0.65) (0.60)
Constant 1.438*** 1.038*** 1.076*** 27.332* 33.936** 13.195
(3.31) (2.78) (3.00) (1.81) (2.02) (0.87)
R2 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.33 0.33 0.40
Hausman 21.64 50.84* 30.98 5.16 5.42 10.07
LM 1304.67*** 1243.75*** 1276.61*** 221.75*** 179.55*** 113.43***
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Test of equality (p-value): LEV*Cons 0.35 0.96 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.53
Test of equality (p-value): LEV*1-Cons 0.28 0.63 0.27 0.47 0.46 0.52
Test of equality (p-value): PROF*Cons 0.00 0.49 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.06
Test of equality (p-value): PROF*1-Cons 0.69 0.77 0.60 0.53 0.52 0.52
Test of equality (p-value): ZSCORE*Cons 0.00 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): ZSCORE*1-Cons 0.90 0.59 0.37 0.22 0.23 0.23
Notes: The dependent variable is the credit spread, as de¯ned by the di®erence between corporate bond yields and government bond
yields of the same maturity. D is a dummy variable, which takes value 1 for the recession/credit crunch period, and 0 otherwise. The
dummy variable CONS indicates in turn SMALL, HIGHLY INDEBTED, and RISKY ¯rms. Robust z-statistics are reported in the round
brackets. The standard errors are corrected for clustering. The Hausman Test is distributed as a chi-squared distribution under the null of
no correlation between the regressors and the individual e®ects. The Langrangian Multiplier Test (LM test) is distributed as chi-squared
and the null is that the individual e®ect is zero. Numbers of ¯rms and of observations are 635 and 2657, respectively in the US. Numbers of
¯rms and of observations are 81 and 255, respectively in the Asian sample. Also see notes to Table 1. * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at




SIZE INDEBT COV SIZE INDEBT COV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LEVit ¤ Cons 0.017*** 0.007** 0.008* 0.354*** 0.184** 0.514***
(2.84) (2.09) (1.64) (3.45) (2.46) (3.88)
LEVit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) 0.010** 0.007 0.004 0.087 -0.003 0.105*
(2.44) (1.14) (1.52) (1.20) (-0.0071) (1.72)
PROFit ¤ Cons -0.036** -0.025*** -0.030** -0.872*** -0.514*** -2.770***
(-2.35) (-3.53) (-2.32) (-3.71) (-3.18) (-4.21)
PROFit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) -0.029*** -0.016* -0.006 -0.083 -0.001 0.042
(-4.16) (-1.81) (-0.78) (-0.49) (-0.0051) (0.30)
ZSCOREit ¤ Cons -0.126** -0.025 0.006 -4.649*** -3.905*** -3.908**
(-2.44) (-0.82) (0.13) (-3.05) (-3.23) (-2.27)
ZSCOREit ¤ (1 ¡ Cons) -0.142*** -0.032 -0.051* -2.426* -2.866 -2.147*
(-3.37) (-0.86) (-1.72) (-1.88) (-1.42) (-1.96)
MATDUM 0.061 0.092 0.080 0.890 0.224 1.552
(0.30) (0.48) (0.42) (0.29) (0.070) (0.62)
Attrition -0.456 -0.279 -0.285 -5.605 -2.110 -3.510
(-1.13) (-0.68) (-0.69) (-1.13) (-0.41) (-0.87)
Constant 1.501*** 1.048*** 1.002*** 27.017 32.324* 0.106
(3.53) (3.32) (3.19) (1.41) (1.91) (0.071)
R2 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.29 0.30 0.48
Notes: The dependent variable is the credit spread, as de¯ned by the di®erence between corporate bond yields and government bond
yields of the same maturity. Attrition is a binary arti¯cial variable taking the value one if the individual is observed over the entire period
(balanced sample) and zero otherwise. Statistically insigni¯cant coe±cients suggest that the model is not a®ected by attrition bias. Numbers
of ¯rms and of observations are 635 and 2657, respectively in the US. Numbers of ¯rms and of observations are 81 and 255, respectively in
the Asian sample. *signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
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Notes: The credit spread is the di®erence between corporate bond yields and government bond yields of the same maturity.
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Notes: Percentiles from top to bottom are 70th, 50th, 30th. The the upper tail of the distribution refers to higher spreads.
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